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ABSTRACT
As organizations struggle with vast amounts of data, out-
sourcing sensitive data to third parties becomes a necessity.
To protect the data, various cryptographic techniques are
used in outsourced database systems to ensure data privacy,
while allowing efficient querying. Recent attacks on such sys-
tems (e.g., [37, 30]) demonstrate that outsourced database
systems must trade-off efficiency and privacy.
Towards designing systems that strike a good balance be-
tween these two aspects, we present a new model of differen-
tially private outsourced database systems, where differential
privacy [19] is preserved at the record level even against an
untrusted server that controls data and queries. Beginning
with an atomic storage model where the server can observe
both the memory access pattern and communication vol-
ume, we provide upper- and lower-bounds on the efficiency
of differentially private outsourced database systems. Our
lower-bounds motivate the examination of models where the
memory access pattern is kept hidden from the server. Com-
bining oblivious RAM [22] with differentially private sani-
tizers [8], we present a generic construction of differentially
private outsourced databases. We have implemented our
constructions and report on their efficiency.
1. INTRODUCTION
Secure outsourced database systems aim at helping
organizations to outsource their data to untrusted third
parties, without compromising data confidentiality or
query efficiency. The main idea is to encrypt the data
records before uploading them to an untrusted server
along with a data structure that dictates which en-
crypted records to retrieve for each query. While strong
cryptographic tools can be used for this task, current
implementations such as CryptDB [39], Cipherbase [2],
and TrustedDB [5] use a combination of weaker primi-
tives with the hope of striking a good privacy-efficiency
trade-off, when answering queries. However, a series
of works [26, 3, 28, 13, 37, 30] demonstrates that these
systems are vulnerable to a variety of reconstruction at-
tacks, i.e., after observing enough encrypted query an-
swers, an adversary (or the untrusted server) can fully
reconstruct the distribution of the records over the do-
main of the indexed attribute. This weakness is promi-
nently due to the access pattern leakage, i.e., the adver-
sary can tell if the same encrypted record is returned
on different queries.
More recently, Kellaris et al. [30] showed that recon-
struction attacks are possible even if the systems em-
ploy heavyweight cryptographic techniques that hide
the access patterns such as fully homomorphic encryp-
tion (FHE) [21, 47] or oblivious RAM (ORAM) [22, 23],
because they leak the size of the result set for a query
to the server (this is referred to as communication vol-
ume leakage). This means that no outsourced database
system can be both optimally efficient and privacy pre-
serving, i.e., secure outsourced database systems should
not return the exact number of records required to an-
swer a query.
We take the next step towards designing secure out-
sourced database systems by presenting constructions
that strike a provable balance between efficiency and
privacy. The core idea of our techniques is to bound the
communication volume leakage by utilizing the notion
of differential privacy [19]. Specifically, instead of re-
turning the exact number of records per query, we only
reveal perturbed query answer sizes by adding dummy
or random encrypted records to the result so that the
communication volume leakage is bounded.
1.1 Contributions
In this work, we design systems that go beyond the
traditional communication volume and access pattern
leakages, by adopting differential privacy and strong
cryptographic techniques. The former is used to perturb
query answer sizes to bound the leakage from commu-
nication volume. The latter allows us to eliminate the
access pattern leakage. Specifically, we introduce a new
notion of differentially private outsourced database sys-
tems. This model considers a strong adversarial server
that controls both the data and the queries made to
them. To establish differential privacy, efficiency must
be reduced, as the server needs to access and return
more than the desired result set on a query. We give
upper- and lower- bounds on the efficiency of such sys-
tems.
Specifically, our contributions in this work are as fol-
lows:
• We introduce DP storage, which utilizes differen-
tial privacy (DP) [19] in order to limit leakage,
while offering tunable efficiency in terms of storage
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(number of records stored to the server) and com-
munication (number of records returned for an-
swering a query).
• We examine an atomic storage model where access
pattern is leaked. In this model we provide very ef-
ficient constructions for DP storage for range and
point queries. The main idea is that for each query
type, we store buckets of encrypted records (real
and dummy ones) to the server, and an index struc-
ture locally. Each time we issue a query, we check
the index in order to determine which buckets we
need to retrieve in order to answer it. We also con-
sider single attribute queries and provide a lower
bound on the efficiency of DP storage.
• We provide a generic construction of DP storage
for arbitrary query families, utilizing a combina-
tion of oblivious RAM [22, 23] and differentially
private sanitization [8]. This construction, referred
to as DP ORAM, provides almost optimal storage
and communication efficiency. The main idea is to
store all the records in an ORAM at the server side
once, and for each query type, we create an index
locally. Each time a query is issued, we check the
index to determine which and how many records
we should retrieve.
• We explore the case of dynamic data, where record
additions, modifications, and deletions are allowed.
We discuss the issues when the access pattern is
leaked and provide upper bounds on the efficiency
in the case of DP ORAM.
• We implemented our constructions, and demon-
strated experimentally their efficiency on a real
dataset of one million records.
1.2 Related Work
Querying encrypted data is a common problem in
both the database and cryptographic community (for an
overview of the cryptographic techniques for search on
encrypted data we recommend the talk of Kamara [29]).
Depending on the query type, different methods have
been proposed. Existing practical solutions can be di-
vided into three categories; (i) bucketization techniques
that partition the domain space and group data records
before indexing (e.g., [24, 27, 26]), (ii) order-preserving
encryption schemes in which the order of cyphertexts is
the same as the order of the plaintexts (e.g. [1, 9, 38]),
and (iii) solutions that use specialized data structures
(e.g. [32, 43, 16]). Although we only focus on queries
that retrieve encrypted records, there are works (e.g.,
[50]) that deal with the problem of answering statistical
queries on outsourced database systems, but they are
beyond our scope.
The first work to suggest bucketization techniques is
[24]. The proposed method builds on the the ideas
of equi-depth and equi-width histogram partitioning.
Records falling into each bin are encrypted. When the
data owner issues a range query, the algorithm first finds
the bins that intersect with the query, and then it re-
turns all the encrypted records in these bins. Return-
ing false positives is inevitable in the bucketization ap-
proach, although the answer is always complete. A more
principled approach in the one-dimensional and multi-
dimensional range query setting reduces the number of
false positives [27, 26].
Agrawal et al. [1] suggested order-preserving encryp-
tion could be used to directly query encrypted data.
The use of order-preserving encryption schemes allows
direct querying as well as building efficient indexing
structures on top of encrypted data. Boldyreva et al. [9]
analyze the security guarantees of order-preserving en-
cryption schemes and provide an efficient implementa-
tion of such techniques. Unfortunately, order preserving
encryption implies significant leakage and hence, given
the results of enough queries, an adversary can get a
very good estimate of the true values of cyphertexts.
[32, 43] suggest using indexing structures on top of
the encrypted data. Specifically, [32] suggest building
an interval tree structure to represent ranges in an hi-
erarchy along each dimension. Alternatively, [43] uses a
binary string encoding of ranges. Essentially, they rep-
resent each range as a set of prefixes, which is similar
to representing each range with a set of nodes in [32].
Unfortunately, as shown in many works (e.g., [26, 3,
28]), all the current methods supporting various queries
on encrypted data can reveal information about the dis-
tribution of the plaintext values on the search domain.
Recently, attacks on existing systems (e.g., CryptDB
[39]) have been introduced ([13, 37]), while [30] iden-
tifies the weaknesses of all secure outsourced database
systems that reveal the communication volume.
Finally, [31] is most closely related to our setting. The
authors generate fake records whose number follows the
Laplace distribution in order to satisfy differential pri-
vacy. However, if a negative number of records is re-
quired, they employ a buffer technique in order to re-
trieve the actual records. This procedure may violate
privacy because an adversary can easily discover when
records are retrieved from the buffer, indicating that
a negative value was drawn from the Laplace distribu-
tion. Furthermore, the constructions do not compose
for different type of queries, as this would require stor-
ing as many copies of the original data as the number
of combinations of query types and data attributes.
2. MODEL
Our model is an extension of the abstract model pre-
sented in [30]. Specifically, we follow the previous generic
constructions of outsourced database systems and ad-
versarial models, while defining three types of queries
and introducing the notion of efficiency.
2.1 Outsourced database systems
We abstract a database as a collection of n records ri
associated with search keys ski:D = {(r1, sk1), . . . , (rn, skn)}.
We will assume that all records have fixed length of κ
bits, and that search keys are elements of domain X .1
1Records of length larger than κ may be split into several
A query is a predicate q : X → {0, 1}. Applying a
query q to a database D results in all records whose
search keys satisfy q, i.e., q(D) = {ri : q(ski) = 1}.
Let Q be a collection of queries. An outsourced data-
base system for queries in Q consists of two protocols
between a user U and a server S:
Setup protocol Πsetup [30]: U has as input a database
D = {(r1, sk1), . . . , (rn, skn)}; S has no input.
The output for U is a query key K and the output
for S is a data structure DS.
Query protocol Πquery [30]: U has as input a query
q ∈ Q and the key K produced in the setup pro-
tocol; S has as input DS produced in the setup
protocol. The output for U is q(D); S has no for-
mal output.
Remark 2.1. The above definition considers the static
case: no updates to D occur beyond initial setup, and,
furthermore, no updates to DS occur while queries are
made. More generally, we can allow U and S in Πquery
to also take as inputs their current states and output
new states. This in particular allows them to modify K
and DS, respectively. This more general definition will
be used in Section 5. We discuss how to handle updates
to D in Section 6.
Furthermore, with the exception of Section 5, we will
assume atomic record storage on the server side in the
following sense:
1. DS = (DS1,DS2) where DS1 = (c1, . . . , cn′} con-
tains encrypted records and DS2 depends solely on
(sk1, . . . , skn) (but not on the content of r1, . . . , rn).
For correctness, DS1 should contain at least one
encrypted copy of each of the records r1, . . . , rn. It
may also contain encryptions of a specific dummy
record (hence, n′ ≥ n).
2. The communication sent from S to U consists of
elements of DS1 plus information that depends
solely on DS2 (and hence, it does not depend on
r1, . . . , rn).
Intuitively, in an atomic outsourced database system,
the server may learn the pattern of accesses to encrypted
records in DS1, and, furthermore, this pattern depends
only on the query q and the search keys sk1, . . . , skn
but not on the content of r1, . . . , rn.
2.2 Query types
In this work we are concerned with the following query
types:
1. Range queries: Here we assume a total ordering on
X and for simplicity that X = {1, . . . , N} for some
N ∈ N. A query q[a,b] is associated with an interval
[a, b] for 1 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ N such that q[a,b](c) = 1 iff
records of length κ all stored with the same search key.
Records of length shorter than κ may be padded. We ignore
in this work the efficiency costs of such splitting/padding.
c ∈ [a, b] for all c ∈ X . The equivalent SQL query
is:
SELECT * FROM table
WHERE attribute BETWEEN a AND b;
2. Point queries: Here X is arbitrary and a query
predicate qa is associated with an element a ∈ X
such that qa(b) = 1 iff a = b. In an ordered do-
main, point queries are degenerate range queries.
The equivalent SQL query is:
SELECT * FROM table
WHERE attribute = a;
3. Attribute queries: Here X = {0, 1}k for some k ∈
N, i.e., a search key corresponds to an array of k
binary attributes. A query qi,b evaluates to 1 if the
value of the ith attribute is b where i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
and b ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., qi,b(a) = 1 iff a[i] = b. The
equivalent SQL query is
SELECT * FROM table
WHERE attribute_i = b;
Note that the difference between point queries and
attribute queries is slightly blurred by the SQL nota-
tion. In point queries the entire search key is checked
for equality whereas in attribute queries the search key
consists of k (binary) parts, attribute_1, ..., at-
tribute_k, of which only one attribute is checked for
equality.
2.3 Measuring Efficiency
We define two basic efficiency measures for an out-
sourced database system.
1. Storage efficiency : It is defined as the number of
encrypted records stored relative to the number of
records in the database. Specifically, we say that
an atomic outsourced database system has stor-
age efficiency of (a1, a2) if the output of the server
DS = (DS1,DS2) for everyD = {(r1, sk1), . . . , (rn, skn)},
where DS1 = (c1, . . . , cn′} for S after executing
Πsetup, and U has input D, satisfies n′ ≤ a1n +
a2. The definition can be extended to the general
(not necessarily atomic) setting by requiring the
foregoing condition where n′ is the number of bits
in the server output and n is number of bits of D.
2. Communication efficiency : It is defined as the num-
ber of encrypted records sent back as the result of
a query relative to the number of records whose
search keys actually satisfy the query. Specifi-
cally, we say that an outsourced database system
for a collection of queries Q has communication
efficiency (a1, a2) if the number m
′ of encrypted
records sent from S to U during a run of Πquery
for every database D = {(r1, sk1), . . . , (rn, skn)}
and every query q ∈ Q, where U has input q and
S has input DS, satisfies m′ ≤ a1m + a2 where
m = |q(D)|, and DS is an output for S on a run
of Πsetup, where U has input D. The definition
can be extended to the general setting as before.
Note that a1 ≥ 1 and a2 ≥ 0 for both measures.
We say that an outsourced database system is opti-
mally storage efficient (resp., optimally communication
efficient) if it has storage efficiency (1,0) (respectively,
communication efficiency (1,0)).
2.4 Adversarial models
We consider privacy for U against an honest-but-curious
S. Intuitively, we want to guarantee that all S can learn
is some allowed “leakage.” As discussed above, in the
atomic model this would include the pattern of accesses
to encrypted records in DS1. To be more general, we
follow the formalization of [30].
For an outsourced database system Π, fix a database
sampling algorithm databaseGen, a query sampling algo-
rithm QueryGen, leakage algorithms Lsetup,Lquery,
and simulator Sim. Consider the following experiments2:
Real Experiment Run Πsetup(D,⊥). Then, until
S halts and outputs a bit, repeat: Sample q ←
QueryGen and run Πquery(q,DS). The output of
the experiment is the output of S.
Ideal Experiment Sample D ← databaseGen where
D = {(r1, sk1), . . . , (rn, skn)}. Run Lsetup(D)
and give the result to Sim. Then, until Sim halts
and outputs a bit, repeat: Sample q ← QueryGen,
run Lquery(q, sk1, . . . , skn) and give the result to
Sim. The output of the experiment is the output
of Sim.
Definition 2.2 ([30]). We say that an outsourced
database system Π is (Lsetup,Lquery)-secure if there
is a simulator Sim such that the output distributions
of the above experiments are computationally indistin-
guishable for any databaseGen,QueryGen.
Above, the function Lsetup is called the “setup leak-
age” and the function Lquery is called the “query leak-
age”. It is useful to define special cases of these algo-
rithms. In the case of Lquery for an atomic outsourced
database system, we define the special case Laccess
(called “access pattern leakage”) that on input a query
q and search keys sk1, . . . , skn, it outputs the indices of
the encrypted records in DS1 that would be sent from
S to U during an execution of Πquery(q,DS) in the
real experiment. This leakage is clearly minimal in the
atomic setting.
Also there is the special case Lcomm (called “com-
munication volume leakage”) that, in the case of an
atomic outsourced database system, instead outputs the
number of such records. In general (not necessarily
in the atomic setting), it outputs the number of bits
that would be sent from S to U during an execution of
Πquery(q,DS) in the real experiment. In the atomic
setting, these formulations are clearly equivalent, as-
suming records have a fixed length.
2We leave the search key domain D and collection of queries
Q supported by Π implicit for readability, and assume that
subsequent sampling algorithms output elements from the
right sets.
3. TOOLS
Here we collect some tools we will use from prior work.
3.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a definition of privacy in analy-
sis that protects information that is specific to individ-
ual records.
More formally, we call databases D1 ∈ Xn and D2 ∈
Xn over a domain X neighboring (denoted D1 ∼ D2) if
they differ in exactly one record.3
Definition 3.1 ([19, 18]). A randomized algorithm
A is (, δ)-differentially private if for all D1 ∼ D2 ∈ Xn,
and for all subsets O of the output space of A,
Pr[A(D1) ∈ O] ≤ exp() · Pr[A(D2) ∈ O] + δ.
The probability is taken over the random coins of A.
When δ=0 we omit it and say that A preserves pure
differential privacy, otherwise (when δ > 0) we say that
A preserves approximate differential privacy.
We will use mechanisms for answering count queries
with differential privacy. Such mechanisms perturb their
output to mask out the effect of any single record on
their outcome.
The simplest method for answering count queries with
differential privacy is the Laplace Perturbation Algo-
rithm (LPA) [19]. Its main idea is to add random noise
drawn from a Laplace distribution to the count to be
published. The noise is scaled so as to hide the effect
any single record can have on the count. More generally,
the LPA can be used to approximate any statistical re-
sult by scaling the noise to a property of the statistical
analysis called sensitivity.
For a query q mapping databases into RN , the sensi-
tivity of q is ∆(q) = maxD1∼D2∈Xn ‖q(D1)− q(D2)‖1.
Theorem 3.2. Let q : D → RN . An algorithm A
that adds independently generated noise from a zero-
mean Laplace distribution with scale λ = ∆(q)/ to
each of the N coordinates of q(D), i.e., which on in-
put D samples an outcome from the distribution q(D)+
(Lap(∆(q)/))
N
satisfies -differential privacy.
While Theorem 3.2 is an effective and simple way of
answering a single count query, we will need to answer
a sequence of count queries, ideally, without imposing
a bound to the length of this sequence. We will hence
resort to the use of sanitization algorithms.
Definition 3.3. Let Q be a collection of queries. An
(, δ, α, β)-differentially private sanitizer for Q is a pair
of algorithms (A,B) such that:
• A is (, δ)-differentially private.
• On input a dataset D = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Xn, A out-
puts a data structure DS such that with probability
1− β for all q ∈ Q, |B(DS, q)−∑i q(di)| ≤ α.
3An alternative is to call D1,D2 neighboring if |D1∆D2| = 1.
Remark 3.4. Given an (, δ, α, β)-differentially pri-
vate sanitizer as in Definition 3.3 one can replace the
answer B(DS, q) by B′(DS, q) = B(DS, q) + α, hence
making sure that (except with probability β) we never
get an underestimate of
∑
i q(di), i.e., with probability
1 − β for all q ∈ Q, 0 ≤ B′(DS, q) −∑i q(di) ≤ 2α.
We will hence assume from now on that sanitizers have
this latter guarantee on their error.
Sanitization (a.k.a. private data release) has been the
topic of much research in differential privacy. Depend-
ing on the query type and the notion of differential pri-
vacy (i.e., pure or approximate), different upper bounds
on the error have been proven. We report on the re-
sults mostly related to this work4. In case of point
queries over domain size N , pure differential privacy
results in α = Θ(logN) [6], while for approximate dif-
ferential privacy α = O(1) [7]. For range queries over
domain size N , these bounds are α = Θ(logN) for pure
differential privacy [8, 20], and α = O(2log
∗N ) for ap-
proximate differential privacy (with an almost matching
lower bound of α = Ω(log∗N)) [7, 11]. For attribute
queries (which are equivalent to 1-way marginals), the
error is α = Θ(k) for pure differential privacy, and
α = Θ(
√
k) for approximate differential privacy, where
k is the number of attributes [12]. More generally, Blum
et al. showed that any query set Q can be sanitized, al-
beit non efficiently [8].
Answering range queries with differential privacy.
A practical solution for answering range queries with
error bounds very close to the optimal ones is the hier-
archical method [20, 25, 48]. The main idea is to build
an aggregate tree on the domain, and add noise to each
node proportional to the tree height (i.e., noise scale
logarithmic to the domain size N). Then, every range
query is answered using the minimum amount of tree
nodes. [40] showed that the hierarchical algorithm of
[25], when combined with their proposed optimizations,
offers the lowest error.
Answering point queries with differential privacy.
Utilizing the LPA for answering point queries results
in error α = O(logN). However, in cases where N >>
n, we can have error that does not depend on N by
using the stability based technique of [10]. Specifically,
the algorithm initially just publishes all point queries
with value zero without noise. Then, for the remaining
ones, it adds noise with scale 1/. If the noisy value
of a point query is smaller than ln(1/δ)/, it answers
it with value zero, otherwise, it returns the computed
noisy value. This technique satisfies (, δ)-differential
privacy and results in error O(log(1/δ)/).
Dynamic data.
Our handling of dynamic data utilizes ideas devel-
4For simplicity of presentation, we omit the dependency on
the privacy parameters , δ and on the accuracy and confi-
dence parameters α, β and focus on the dependency on the
domain size.
oped for updating a counter in an online manner [20,
17]. Suppose the counter runs for T time steps. The
construction maintains a collection of subset sums (con-
structed based on a binary tree) with the following two
properties: (i) each counter event influences O(log T )
of the sums; and (ii) any prefix sum can be estimated
as the addition of O(log T ) sums based on events oc-
curring before it. The additive error at any time is
polylog(T ). Chan et al. [14] showed how to extend
this scheme to counters that may run for an unbounded
number of time steps with additive error at any time t
being O((log t)1.5). Mir et al. [35] further showed how
to handle counters that may also decrease by utilizing
sketches.
Composition.
Finally, we include a composition theorem (adapted
from [34]) based on [19, 18]. It concerns executions
of multiple differentially private mechanisms on non-
disjoint and disjoint inputs.
Theorem 3.5. Let A1, . . . ,Ar be mechanisms, such
that each Ai provides i-differential privacy. Let D1, . . .,
Dr be pairwise non-disjoint (resp. disjoint) datasets.
Let A be another mechanism that executes A1(D1), . . . ,
Ar(Dr) using independent randomness for each Ai, and
returns their outputs. Then, mechanism A is (∑ri=1 i)-
differentially private (resp. (maxri=1 i)-differentially pri-
vate).
3.2 Oblivious RAM
We sketch the definition of Oblivious Random Ac-
cess Machine (ORAM). This notion was first defined by
Goldreich [22] and Goldreich and Ostrovsky [23].
An ORAM protocol can be viewed as a protocol be-
tween a client and server. Specifically, the input of the
client is a sequence y = ((o1, a1, d1), . . . , (on, an, dn))
where oi is a RAM operation, ai is a memory address,
and di is a data value. We speak of y as the program
being executed by the ORAM protocol. During the pro-
tocol execution, the client treats the server as external
memory. Correctness requires that the client obtains
the correct output of the computation (except possibly
with negligible probability). Security requires that for
any two sequences y1,y2 as above of the same length,
the view of the server is indistinguishable.
Some existing efficient ORAM protocols are Square
Root ORAM [22], Hierarchical ORAM [23], Binary-
Tree ORAM [44], Interleave Buffer Shuffle Square Root
ORAM [49], TP-ORAM [45], Path-ORAM [46], and
TaORAM [42]. For detailed descriptions of each proto-
col, we recommend the work of Chang et al. [15]. The
lowest communication and storage overheads of these
protocols are O(log n) and O(n), respectively, and they
are achieved by TP-ORAM, Path-ORAM, and TaO-
RAM.
4. DP STORAGE
We now introduce the notion of differentially private
outsourced database systems. To define it, we consider
a stronger adversarial model than that of Section 2.4,
in which the adversary can choose the data and the
queries. Namely, consider the ideal experiment where
databaseGen just outputs a fixed value D, and the out-
put of Lquery includes q itself5. Call this experiment
the strong ideal experiment when D is outsourced and
let ViewSim(D) denote the view of Sim in this experi-
ment.
Definition 4.1. An outsourced database system is
(, δ)-differentially private if it is (Lsetup,Lquery)-
secure for some Lsetup,Lquery such that for any D
and QueryGen, we have that ViewSim(D) satisfies (, δ)-
differential privacy; that is, for all neighboring databases
D,D′ and all (even computationally unbounded) distin-
guishers A,
Pr[A(ViewSim(D)) = 1] ≤ exp ()·Pr[A(ViewSim(D′)) = 1]+δ
The above definition is inspired by a notion of compu-
tational differential privacy due to Mironov et al. [36],
where, loosely speaking, a function is said to be compu-
tationally differentially private if its output is compu-
tationally indistinguishable from that of a differentially
private function.
We begin by showing how combining existing sani-
tization techniques results in DP storage systems for
range and point queries. These constructions are in
the atomic model, i.e., differential privacy is achieved
in spite of the server being able to learn the pattern of
accesses to encrypted records.
4.1 DP storage systems for range queries
The input is a collection of (encrypted) records, each
with an index in the ordered domain [1, N ]. We view
these records as the content of a histogram with N bins,
where each bin 1 ≤ i ≤ N holds the encrypted records
with index i.
The main idea is to use bucketization, i.e., merge
neighboring histogram bins in order to form b << N
buckets containing (roughly) the same number of records.
In the buckets, we will include both original encrypted
records and encrypted special dummy records, however,
because of our use of encryption, the server would not
be able to tell real records from dummy records. Intu-
itively, the dummy records would be used to inflate the
count of records in buckets in order to preserve differ-
ential privacy.
Figure 1 shows an example for n = 7 records with
indices taken from domain of size N = 4, put in b = 2
buckets. The real records stored are r1, . . . , r7 and the
special dummy record is r′. The encrypted records are
c1, . . . , c7 and c
′, respectively. We emphasize that each
“copy” of the encrypted dummy record, c′, is encrypted
using fresh randomness (hence, these ciphertexts are all
different, and, furthermore, indistinguishable from the
encryptions of real records).
The setup algorithm works as follows. Initially, we
compute a differentially private cumulative histogram
5Equivalently, each invocation of QueryGen is instead han-
dled by Sim.
Ordered
records
Dummy
record
Unencrypted Data (Owner)
Encrypted Data (Server)
Domain
Buckets
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7
r′
c1, c2, c3, c4, c
′, c′ c5, c6, c7, c′, c′, c′
Figure 1: System for range queries
using an efficient (, δ, α, β)-differentially private sani-
tizer (A,B) for range queries and negligible β. Essen-
tially, we need to retrieve differentially private answers
for N range queries, i.e., q[1,1], q[1,2], . . . , q[1,N ]. Then,
given the number of buckets b, we calculate the number
of records per bucket dn/be, and discover the borders
of each bucket (i.e. the bins to merge) from the noisy
cumulative histogram, so that each bucket covers dn/be
records. Figure 2 shows an example for b = 5. After
determining the borders, we store in each bucket the
actual records covered by its range.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Figure 2: Cumulative histogram for determining
the bucket borders for b = 5
Due to the differentially private approximation of the
cumulative histogram, each bucket range may not cover
exactly dn/be records. Recall that by Remark 3.4 the
sanitization provides an overcount for the actual num-
ber of real records in the range, and hence we supple-
ment the records in each range with encrypted dummy
records to reach this overcount. Using best known re-
sults for sanitizing range queries (and hence cumulative
histograms) with pure and approximate differential pri-
vacy, the values for α areO,β(logN) andO,δ,β(2
log∗N ),
respectively. Overall, when storing n records, the stor-
age needed for our construction is n+bα which amounts
to storage efficiency of (O(1), O(b·logN)) or (O(1), O(b·
2log
∗N )) depending on the sanitization used. The re-
sulted buckets with the encrypted real and dummy records
are uploaded to the server, while the user keeps a local
index of the ranges covered by the buckets.
To assess the communication overhead, note that an-
swering queries is as in other bucketization construc-
tions, i.e., all records in buckets corresponding to inter-
vals that intersect the range query are retrieved. Such
a range contains approximately n/b real records and α
dummy records. In addition, up to two bucket ranges
intersect the query range without being contained in it,
and it may be that the indices of all these records are
outside the range of the query. We hence get that the
communication efficiency is (O(1 + bα/n), O(n/b+ α))
which amounts to (O(1+ b logN/n), O(n/b+logN)) or
(O(1 + b2log
∗N/n), O(n/b+ 2log
∗N )), depending on the
sanitization used.
We summarize the above in a theorem where, for con-
creteness, we choose b = O(n/α) in which case stor-
age efficiency becomes (O(1), 0) and communication ef-
ficiency becomes (O(1), O(α)). We omit the depen-
dency on , δ, β for readability.
Theorem 4.2. Given an (, δ, α, β)-differentially pri-
vate sanitizer for range queries (alternatively, cumula-
tive histogram), there exists an atomic outsourced database
system Π in the atomic model for range queries with
storage efficiency (O(1), 0) and communication efficiency
(O(1), O(α)) where Lquery includes Laccess.
4.2 DP storage systems for point queries
The main idea of our construction is to prepare, for
each point query qa where a ∈ [N ] a collection of en-
crypted records – those with search key equal to a plus
encryption of the dummy records. Privacy would be
preserved if the overall counts would preserve differen-
tial privacy and correctness would be preserved if the
count would always be an overcount.
More formally, the collection of queriesQ = {qa}a∈[N ]
corresponds to a histogram with N bins. It is well
known that such a histogram can be published with
differential privacy if each bin is perturbed via the ad-
dition of Laplace noise with scale 1/ [19]. To ensure all
counts are overcounts except for probability β, an off-
set of magnitude O,β(logN) needs to be added to all
bins. This means that storage is inflated by an addition
of O,β(N logN) dummy records, and communication
is inflated by O(logN) dummy records.
Theorem 4.3. There exists an outsourced database
system Π in the atomic model that supports point queries
with storage efficiency (1, O(N logN)) and communi-
cation efficiency (1, O(logN)) where Lquery includes
Laccess.
When N is large, the high additional cost in stor-
age (resulting from the addition of O(logN) records per
each point of the domain) can be reduced using random
hashing. For example, when all records have distinct
search keys, applying a two-choice hashing scheme [4]
with hash functions mapping into [n] would result in
storage efficiency (O(log n), 0) and communication effi-
ciency (O(log log n), O(log n)). To see why the scheme
preserves differential privacy note that, by a simple in-
duction proof, a change in one of the search keys would
be reflected in the counts of at most two histogram bins,
where one count would increase by one, and the other
would decrease by one.
More generally, assume that there are N ′ < n domain
positions that are non-empty (see Figure 3). Let θ be
𝜃
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Figure 3: Bin hashing example
a predefined threshold that depends on n, , δ (denoted
as a dotted horizontal line). There are at most n/θ
domain positions with more than θ records (denoted
with white bars). In order to discover them, we use a
stability based technique [10]. Specifically, we compute
noisy counts of the N ′ domain positions that are non-
empty by spending privacy budget ′ = /2√
n/θ
(we view
 as a privacy budget shared between two mechanisms
by utilizing Theorem 3.5). Then, we publish overcounts
for the bins with noisy values larger than θ by using an
offset of magnitude O(θ). By taking into account the
expected error due to the noise addition, we need to set
θ > ln (2/δ)′ =
2 ln (2/δ)
√
n

√
θ
or θ >
(
2 ln (2/δ)

) 2
3
3
√
n. This
results in an additive storage cost of nθ
√
n/θ
/2 =
(
n
θ
)1.5 · 2
for these bins.
For the domain positions that have less than θ records
(denoted with different shades of gray in Figure 3), we
want to use hashing in order to hash them into m buck-
ets, and then publish the differentially private versions
of these buckets using the remaining ( − ′) budget.
By setting m =
(
n
θ
)1.5 · 2 , θ = √n, and using two-way
hashing, we get a multiplicative storage overhead of 1/,
while the maximum number of records per bucket is√
n log log n. The communication overhead for retriev-
ing a bucket (i.e., if we need to retrieve records in do-
main positions with small number of records) is additive
and equal to
√
n log log n+1/, while for retrieving a bin
with a large number of records, it is
√
n/. As such, our
scheme results in storage efficiency of (O(1), O(n3/4))
and communication efficiency of (O(1), O(
√
n).
4.3 DP storage systems for attribute queries
The above constructions for range and point queries
may suggest that efficient constructions in the atomic
model exist in general, or at least for small or simple
families of queries. We now consider the family of at-
tribute queries over k attributes and demonstrate, via
a lower bound, that this is not the case.
Theorem 4.4. Let Π be an atomic outsourced database
system for attribute queries with storage efficiency (t, 0)
and communication efficiency (1, a), and assume Lquery
includes Laccess. Furthermore, assume that (i) a/n ≤
1/4 and (ii) k/t = ω(log n). Then, there is no negligible
δ such that Π is (, δ)-differentially private for some .
Proof. We first choose two (random) databases that
we will execute Π on. (i) Let D be a database of arbi-
trary n records, each with a search key selected inde-
pendently and uniformly at random from {0, 1}k. (ii)
Let D′ be a neighboring database constructed from D as
follows: A random search key I from D is replaced with
a fresh search key I¯ chosen independently and uniformly
at random from {0, 1}k. That is, databases D,D′ are
identical except for search keys I, I¯. We now construct
a distinguisher A for the views of the server on D and
D′.
Recall that for an atomic outsourced database sys-
tem DS = (DS1,DS2) and DS1 = (c1, . . . , cn′} where
n′ ≤ tn (because on our assumptions on storage ef-
ficiency). Our distinguisher first makes all 2k possi-
ble queries, namely each query qi,b for i ∈ [n] and
b ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the adversary computes for every
c ∈ DS1 its corresponding “partially reconstructed at-
tribute vector”, that is, xc ∈ {0, 1,⊥,>}k defined as
follows: set xc[i] = 0 if c is returned on query qi,0 but
not on query qi,1; set xc[i] = 1 if c is returned on query
qi,1 but not on query qi,0; set xc[i] = ⊥ if c is returned
on both qi,0 and qi,1; and set xc[i] = > otherwise.
Before we continue with the description of our adver-
sary, we prove a simple technical claim:
Claim 4.5. Let X denote the total number of entries
that are either 0 or 1 in the partially reconstructed at-
tribute vectors {xc}, when Π is executed with database
D. Then, X ≥ kn/2.
Proof. Let T denote the total number ciphertexts
in DS1 returned on all 2k queries, and let B denote
the total number of ⊥ entries across all the partially
reconstructed attribute vectors for ciphertexts in DS1.
Then, we have
T ≤
∑
queries (i,b)
(|qi,b(D)|+ a) = kn+ 2ka.
On the other hand, each entry in xc corresponding to ⊥
means that c was returned on at least two queries, hence
T ≥ kn+B. Combining the above yields B ≤ 2ka. We
get thatX = kn−B ≥ kn−2ka ≥ kn−2k(n/4) = kn/2,
where we used a ≤ n/4.
It follows that there exists an entry c∗ ∈ DS1 with
xc∗ containing at least X/n
′ ≥ kn/2nt = k/2t entries
in {0, 1}. The distinguisher A outputs 1 if the zero/one
entries in xc∗ match the search key I, otherwise A out-
puts 0.
Note that when Π is executed with D, the distin-
guisher A outputs 1 with probability at least 1/n (the
probability is over the randomness of Π and the random
choice of D). Also note that D′ is independent of I and
hence, I is distributed uniformly given D′.
Consider now an execution of Π on D′ and the par-
tial reconstruction vectors computed then by A. The
distinguisher A outputs 1 only if the uniformly random
I matches at least k/2t entries in at least one of the n
search keys in D′. We now bound this probability.
For each partial reconstruction vector created by A,
if the vector contains at least k/2t zero/one entries
then I matches these entries with probability at most
2−k/2t. As there are n′ ≤ nt vectors, we conclude that
A outputs 1 with probability at most nt2−k/2t. As
k/t = ω(log n) we get that this probability is negligi-
ble.
We conclude that the distinguisher’s output when D′
is 1 with negligible probability whereas it is at least
1/n when D is outsourced, violating (, δ)-differential
privacy for any negligible δ.
4.4 Limitations of the atomic model
Although our constructions are efficient for range and
point queries, there is no efficient construction for at-
tribute queries. More importantly, for each query type
on a specific attribute, our algorithms require that the
server keeps a different copy of the original encrypted
data and the dummy records. As such, a system sup-
porting queries on multiple attributes cannot be effi-
cient in the atomic case. This issue motivates us in the
next section to use an alternative to the atomic storage
model which allows efficient composition.
5. DP ORAM
Let Q be a collection of queries. We are interested
in building a differentially private outsourced database
system for Q, called DP ORAM. Our solution will use
two building blocks:
• An ORAM protocol ORAM.
• An (, δ, α, β)-differentially private sanitizer (A,B)
for Q and negligible β.
Our protocol Π = (Πsetup,Πquery) of DP ORAM
works as follows:
Setup protocol Πsetup: Let U ’s input be a database
D = {(r1, sk1), . . . , (rn, skn)}, then U and S ex-
ecute the following program6 using ORAM (with
U playing the role of the client and S playing the
role of the server): On input D, store D in external
memory. This concludes the program description.
U also runs A on input (sk1, . . . , skn) to produce
an output DS, and then sends DS to S. The out-
puts of U and S (in Πsetup) are their final states
from the execution of ORAM; in addition, the out-
put of S includes DS.
Query protocol Πquery: Let U ’s input be a query
q ∈ Q and its state, and S’s input be its state,
U first sends q to S and then S runs B on in-
puts DS and q, and sends the result c˜ to U . Let
c← c˜+αn. Let rc be the number of reads from ex-
ternal memory that U would make in the following
if |q(D)| = c. S and U use their states to execute
the following program using ORAM (again, with
U playing the role of the client and S playing the
role of the server): Compute and retrieve q(D); in
addition, fetch an additional rc − |q(D)| external
memory locations and discard the results. This
6Here and below for simplicity of the presentation, we avoid
explicitly writing the program in the format used in the
ORAM definition.
concludes the program description. U ’s output is
q(D); U and S also output their updated states,
which are used as inputs in the next execution.
Note above that in any execution of Πquery we have
c ≥ q(D) with overwhelming probability, and thus the
protocol is well-defined.
Theorem 5.1. DP ORAM is (, δ)-differentially pri-
vate.
Server Client
ORAM
Query
DP for range DP for point DP for attribute
Record Index
Figure 4: DP ORAM
Specifically, we store all records to the server using
ORAM (see Figure 4). Next, for each query type, we
use an efficient (, δ, α, β)-differentially private sanitizer
that dictates how many records we should receive for
answering a query q. Then, the user retrieves the actual
records required for the query using a local index, plus
some random records in order to match the required
number dictated by the sanitizer. Again, in order to
ensure that each query receives enough records, we use
the sanitizer for each query type as described in Re-
mark 3.4. The storage efficiency is optimal, since we
store the database once using ORAM, independent of
the number of indexed attributes or query types, while
the communication efficiency depends on the the query
type. We have the following corollaries for the efficiency
of the system in the cases of approximate and pure dif-
ferential privacy.
Corollary 5.2. Let Π be an outsourced database sys-
tem for point queries with storage efficiency (O(1), 0),
and assume Lquery does not include Laccess. De-
pending on the query type, Π offers the following com-
munication efficiency.
• Range queries: (O(log n), O(2log∗N ))
• Point queries: (O(log n), O(1))
• Attribute queries: (O(log n), O(√k)
Then, there is a negligible δ such that Π satisfies (, δ)-
differential privacy for some .
Proof. By using ORAM, we store only the origi-
nal data once and hence, we get optimal storage effi-
ciency (see Section 3.2). The communication efficiency
depends on the upper bound of the error for each san-
itizer when δ > 0, as described in Section 3.1 and Re-
mark 3.4. Moreover, the most efficient ORAM protocol
to date has O(log n) communication overhead (see Sec-
tion 3.2).
Corollary 5.3. Let Π be an outsourced database sys-
tem for point queries with storage efficiency (O(1), 0),
and assume Lquery does not include Laccess. De-
pending on the query type, Π offers the following com-
munication efficiency.
• Range queries: (O(log n), O(logN))
• Point queries: (O(log n), O(logN))
• Attribute queries: (O(log n), O(k))
Then, Π satisfies -differentially privacy for some .
Proof. Similarly, we derive the proof by considering
the use of ORAM and the upper bound of the error for
each sanitizer when δ = 0 in Section 3.1.
6. DYNAMIC DATA
In this section, we deal with the case where D is dy-
namic, i.e., we may add, modify, or delete records. We
refer to any of these actions as an update, and we assume
that the user keeps the updates locally until they reach
a specific number u, in which case she uploads them to
the server. We refer to the updated database D after
uploading the t’th batch of updates as Dt. When re-
trieving a query answer from the server, the user also
checks the local updates and modifies the result accord-
ingly, if necessary. For simplicity, we assume that the
number of records nt of Dt, for any t, as well as value u
are not private, i.e., an adversary may infer how many
records we have added/removed, and how often we up-
load u updates.
noisy
local
u=2
addition addition deletion modification
Figure 5: Update tree structure for dynamic
data
The main idea is to rebuild the indexes for each query
type after accumulating u updates by utilizing a binary
tree structure on the updates (see Dynamic data in Sec-
tion 3.1). For example, in case of point queries, each
node of the binary tree holds a histogram on the in-
dexed domain with the changes (see Figure 5). At the
leaf level, an addition is depicted as a histogram with
all the bin values equal to zero except for the position
of the added record which has the value of 1. Simi-
larly, a deletion is represented by a similar histogram,
but with a value of −1 to the position of the removed
record. A record modification is viewed as either a his-
togram with all values equal to 0, in case the change is
not on the indexed attribute, or a histogram with all
the bin values equal to zero except for two bins; the
one representing the old value has a value of −1, and
the bin representing the new value gets the value of 1.
Each parent node is the sum of the histograms of its
children. Since we update the database and the indices
after collecting u updates, we ensure differential privacy
by adding noise only to the nodes that cover at least u
children (the nodes above the dotted line in Figure 5).
The noise scale should be proportional to log t, where
t is the number of uploads so far, and the current his-
togram at time t is computed by adding the minimum
amount of noisy histograms/nodes that cover the range
from 1 to t.
In case of the atomic DP storage, updating the in-
dices essentially requires to rebuild the whole storage
system. This renders the update process impractical.
One may be tempted to avoid re-encrypting and re-
uploading all the data after u updates, by just remov-
ing/adding copies of dummy records in order to satisfy
the newly computed overcounts for each bucket (in case
of range queries) or bins (in case of point queries). How-
ever, this process would potentially violate privacy, as
an adversary would be able to infer some or all of the
dummy records at a time t′ < t. This is because each
time we upload the updates, we use fresh randomness
in order to determine the number of dummy records per
bin. In case no updates concern a specific bin through-
out the update process, an adversary can observe which
records are removed/added and which ones remain un-
changed. The former indicate dummy records, while
the latter would be real records with high probability,
especially as more updates occur.
However, this is not the case for the DP ORAM con-
structions. ORAM supports oblivious record updates
(since reading and writing are indistinguishable), and
the previous process can be used to update only the
local structures that dictate the required number of re-
trieved records for answering each query. As such, after
accumulating u updates we rebuild the indices follow-
ing the constructions in Section 5, and computing the
current noisy histograms in case of point queries (or any
other index structure in case of other queries) by sum-
ming the updates so far. The only difference is that the
required noise scale for satisfying differential privacy is
increased proportional to the update tree height. By
utilizing the constructions of [14], and assuming an in-
finite number of updates, the error of each query type
increases multiplicatively by a factor of O((log t)1.5).
Regarding the choice of value u, the user could de-
fine u depending on her available storage, since the
user keeps at most u updates locally at any given time.
However, we would like to keep updates until we have
enough data to upload with relatively small error, i.e.,
the storage and communication overheads are smaller
than the number of updates. As such, we should set
u dynamically and proportional to O((log t)1.5) as well
as to the expected communication efficiency per query
type.
A final remark concerns the case where we want to
hide the value of nt, for any t, in order to perturb
the number of additions, modifications, and deletions
that took place. A simple solution would be to keep a
noisy counter on the total number of records in Dt, by
utilizing another update tree structure and spending a
portion of the privacy budget . This structure would
simply hold at each leaf node the value 1 for an addi-
tion, -1 for a deletion, and 0 for a record update. Each
parent node would be the sum of its children, plus noise
if the node covers more than u leaf nodes. Each time
we need to upload u updates, we also update a global
noisy value nt which represents the number of records
in the database, and (i) we make sure that it is an over-
count on the number of records in the database and
(ii) we upload dummy records to the ORAM in order
to match it. However, this procedure would deterio-
rate the storage efficiency of DP ORAM from (O(1), 0)
to O(1), O((log t)1.5), because we would need to have
O((log t)1.5) dummy records uploaded at any t, in or-
der to match the noisy overcount of the database size.
7. IMPLEMENTATIONS
We describe in turn practical implementations for range
and point queries in the atomic storage model, and for
range, point, and attribute queries using the ORAM.
In all our constructions we use algorithms that satisfy
pure differential privacy, i.e., we set δ = 0. The exten-
sions for dynamic data are straightforward and as such
are omitted, since we only need to consider that the
noise scale increases logarithmically to the number of
updates.
7.1 System for range queries
We follow the construction described in Section 4.1 by
utilizing the method of [40] for computing range queries.
Specifically, we build a kb-ary tree on the histogram
bins7. Each tree node keeps the number of records in
the range it covers. Then, we add Laplace noise with
mean 0 and scale logkb N/ to each node value. Using
this structure, we approximate the CDF of the original
records on the search domain. Essentially, we calculate
the cumulative histogram using the kb-ary tree.
Recall that due to the differentially private approxi-
mation of the cumulative histogram, each bucket range
may not cover exactly dn/be records. If there are fewer
records in the range, we add copies of the dummy record.
However, if the covered records are more than dn/be, we
would have to ignore some of them, which is not possible
in our setting. Thus, we increase the required number
of records per bucket by a value µb, i.e., we need each
bucket to hold dn/be+ µb records.
We compute the minimum required value of µb, so
that the probability any bucket covers more than dn/be+
µb records is bounded by β, for negligible β. By utiliz-
ing the tree structure, each bucket size is determined
by adding at most 2(kb − 1) logkb N noisy node values.
7In order to increase accuracy when computing ranges, we
should set kb = 16 [40]
Thus, the probability of any bucket covering more than
dn/be + µb records is upper bounded by the probabil-
ity we draw noise from the Laplace distribution during
the aggregate tree construction, with value lower than
−µb at least once, plus the probability we draw at least
two times noise with value less than −µb/2, and so on,
plus the probability we draw up to 2(kb − 1) logkb N
times noise with value less than −µb/(2(kb−1) logkb N).
Therefore, we can set µb as the lowest value that satis-
fies the following inequality.
1−
2(kb−1) logkb N−1∑
i=0
(
1−
i∑
k=0
((nodes
k
)
·
(1
2
e
− µb·
logkb
N·(i+1)
)k
·
(
1− 1
2
e
− µb·
logkb
N·(i+1)
)nodes−k))
≤ (1− β)
where nodes = kb
dlogkb (kb−1)+logkb N−1e−1
kb−1 +N is the total
number of tree nodes.
We store the buckets with the encrypted records (real
and dummy) on the server, and we keep locally which
buckets cover each range query. When we need to an-
swer a range query, we retrieve all the encrypted records
in the buckets that cover it. Then, we decrypt them and
discard the dummy records.
7.2 System for point queries
Instead of utilizing the stability based technique de-
scribed in Section 4.2, we use the LPA algorithm, in or-
der to ensure pure differential privacy. Specifically, for
every histogram bin, we draw noise from the Laplace
distribution with mean µp and scale λ = 1/. We have
to set µp such that if values are drawn from Lap(µp, 1/)
at least as many times as the number of bins N , they
are all positive with high probability 1−β, for negligible
β.
We can compute the exact minimum required value of
µp in order to ensure drawing positive values with high
probability by using the CDF of the Laplace distribu-
tion. Specifically, µp should be equal to the minimum
value that satisfies the following inequality.
(
1− 1
2
e−µp·
)N
≤ (1− β). (1)
We can also utilize the two-choice hashing described
in Section 4.2. In practice, the distribution of records
over the domain may be skewed. In other words, the
histogram may consist of some bins with a large amount
of records, while the rest incorporate a small number of
them. As such, we utilize hashing in order to hash the
bins with few records into a small number of buckets,
before applying the LPA, in order to increase the storage
efficiency.
Specifically, we first determine the number of bins Nl
that have smaller number of records than a threshold
θ = O(µp). We use a portion of our privacy budget 
to discover these bins in a differentially private manner.
Then, we put these Nl bins into Nb < Nl buckets, by
using two-choice hashing. The final structure consists of
the original N −Nl bins padded with dummy records,
and Nb buckets that incorporate the Nl original bins
along with some dummy records. The specific choice of
θ ensures that for each bucket or bin, we store at least
as many real records as dummy ones. Subsequently, we
set a new N as N −Nl +Nb, and we run our algorithm
as before with the remaining privacy budget. The user
keeps track of which bucket holds which bins by utilizing
a local look-up table, in order to be able to retrieve the
required records per query.
7.3 DP ORAM for range, point, and attribute
queries
Initially, we store all records to the server using ORAM.
For range queries, we implement the aggregate tree method
as the sanitizer. Specifically, we build a complete kh-
ary tree on the domain, for a given kh. Each leaf node
holds the number of records falling into each bin plus
some noise. Each parent node holds sum of the leaf val-
ues in the range covered by this node, plus noise. Each
time a query is issued, we find the minimum amount of
nodes that cover the range, and determine the required
number of returned records by summing these node val-
ues. Then, we ask the server to retrieve the records in
the range, plus to retrieve multiple random records so
that the total number of retrieved records matches the
required number of returned records.
The noise per node is drawn from the Laplace dis-
tribution with mean µh and scale λ = logkh N/. We
determine the mean value µh, so that we avoid drawing
negative values with high probability. We have to set µh
such that if values are drawn from Lap(µh, logkh N/)
at least as many times as the nodes in the tree, they are
all positive with high probability 1−β, for negligible β.
Again, we can compute the exact minimum required
value of µh in order to ensure drawing positive values
with high probability by using the CDF of the Laplace
distribution. Specifically, µh should be equal to the
minimum value that satisfies the following inequality.
(
1− 1
2
e
− µh·logkh N
)nodes
≤ (1− β).
where nodes =
k
dlogkh (kh−1)+logkh N−1e
h −1
kh−1 +N is the total
number of tree nodes.
For point queries, we use the LPA method as the sani-
tizer. The noisy histogram that is used to compute how
many records we should receive, is built similarly to the
description in Section 7.2 and the mean of the Laplace
noise is computed using Formula 1. We do not use the
hashing technique for merging bins in this case, since
by using ORAM, we store the original data once, and
hence, hashing cannot improve the storage efficiency.
For attribute queries, we use again the LPA method
as the sanitizer. We compute the number qi of 1’s per
column i, and perturb it with Laplace noise of scale k/,
resulting in qˆi. For the number of 0’s per column, we
set it equal to qˆ′i = n− qˆi. In order to ensure that both
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Figure 6: Atomic DP storage for range queries
qˆi and qˆ
′
i are overcounts, we increase them by µw, which
is set to the minimum value that satisfies the following
inequality. (
1− 1
2
e−
µw·
k
)k
≤ (1− β).
8. EXPERIMENTS
We present some preliminary results on the storage
and communication efficiency of our algorithms in the
atomic storage model (Atomic DP storage) and in the
ORAM (DP ORAM), for the case of static data. We
implemented our method in Java, and ran each exper-
iment 100 times on an Intel Core i7 2.5GHz machine
with 16GB of RAM, running MacOS 10.12. We ran the
experiments using the Public Use Microdata Sample for
California (PUMS) dataset. It consists of 1, 048, 575
individuals, each having 10 attributes. We view each
individual as a record, and order the records accord-
ing to the income attribute, for a discretized domain of
size 7, 578. We set  = 0.1 and β = 2−20. In order
to measure storage efficiency, we compute parameter
a = n
′
n , where n is the number of actual records and n
′
the stored ones. Similarly, for communication efficiency
we measure a = m
′
m , where m is the number of required
records to answer a query and m′ the total number of
returned records. For the communication efficiency, we
use the average efficiency over all possible queries of a
specific type. In case of specific range sizes, we use the
average efficiency of all queries of the given range size.
8.1 Atomic DP storage for range queries
First, we evaluate the atomic DP storage system for
range queries (Figure 6). Initially, we check how the
number of buckets b affects the storage and communi-
cation efficiency (Figure 6(a)). We set b as multiples
of logN , because they offered the best results. The
point that lies closer to the origin of the axes depicts
the b values that offers the best trade-off between stor-
age and communication. As such, we have implemented
our method with b = 4 logN .
Then (Figure 6(b)), shows the communication effi-
ciency for different query ranges. The x-axis (i.e., selec-
tivity) depicts the range size as a percentage of the to-
tal number of histogram bins. As expected, the smaller
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Figure 7: Atomic DP storage for point queries
the query size, the higher the communication cost, since
we retrieve all the records in a bucket in order to an-
swer a range that only needs a portion of them. As the
query range increases, all the actual records in a bucket
are needed, and hence, the communication cost is only
affected by the encrypted dummy records. Thus, the
communication efficiency of the method gets closer to
the optimal one.
8.2 Atomic DP storage for point queries
The second set of experiments evaluates the perfor-
mance of the atomic system for point queries (Figure
7). First, we fine-tune the parameters for the hash-
ing algorithm (Figure 7(a)). Specifically, we plot the
trade-off between storage and communication efficiency
for different values of threshold θ (which directly affects
the number Nl of bins to be merged) and Nb (i.e., the
number of buckets which hold the Nl bins). We choose
as threshold θ multiples of the average error due to the
Laplace noise. We depict different values of θ with dif-
ferent colors, i.e., θ =
√
2 1 with black color, blue color
represents θ = 10
√
2 1 , and green is for θ = 20
√
2 1 . In
each case, Nl is different. For Nb, we choose multiples
of
√
N . We depict experiments for Nb = 10
√
Nl with
a cross, Nb = 20
√
Nl with a circle, and Nb = 30
√
Nl
with a triangle. The point which is closer to the ori-
gin of the axes offers the best trade-off between storage
and communication efficiency. As such, we choose the
parameters of θ = 10
√
2 1 and Nb = 20
√
Nl for the
method that utilizes hashing.
Figure 7(b) compares the performance of this method
versus the method that does not utilize hashing. We ob-
serve that there is no absolute winner (i.e., no algorithm
is better in both the aspects of storage and communica-
tion than the other). As such, the choice of the method
depends on the needs of a specific application; if hash-
ing is not used, we get better communication efficiency,
otherwise, it increases the communication cost, but re-
duces the storage requirements.
8.3 DP ORAM
Finally, we evaluate our system that utilizes ORAM
along with differentially private sanitizers for range, point,
and attribute queries (Figure 8). In order to compute
the efficiency we use as baseline a database system that
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keeps the records in an ORAM and retrieves them with-
out utilizing differential privacy. This way, we measure
the efficiency independent of the ORAM protocol used.
Figure 8(a) depicts the communication efficiency for
range, point, and attribute queries. In case of range
queries, the efficiency is really good because the large
range sizes render the number of arbitrary records re-
trieved in order to satisfy differential privacy much smaller
relatively to the actual records required for answering
the query. For point queries, the efficiency is much
worse than that of range queries, due to the bins with
a small number of actual records. For those bins, a
point query retrieves a relatively large number of ar-
bitrary records. For attribute queries, instead of the
income attribute, we use the binary attributes of race
(namely latino, black, and asian) and married. We re-
port the average communication efficiency for retrieving
the records with ‘true’ or ‘false’ value on each attribute
(i.e., 8 different queries in total). The communication
efficiency is similar to that of range queries because the
number of records that have either ‘true’ or ‘false’ is
large relatively to the number of arbitrary records re-
trieved in order to satisfy differential privacy.
Figure 8(b) depicts how the range size affects the
communication efficiency. Similar to the case of the
atomic DP storage system, the smaller the query size,
the higher the communication cost. This is due to the
fact that the hierarchical tree method for answering
range queries offers the same absolute error indepen-
dent of the query size. As such, smaller ranges require
to retrieve less actual records than arbitrary ones for
differential privacy. This renders the relative efficiency
much worse than that in the case of large ranges, since
the latter return much more actual records than arbi-
trary ones.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We have introduced differentially private outsourced
database systems that support range, point, and at-
tribute queries. The proposed constructions offer a de-
sirable trade-off between efficiency and privacy. Al-
though atomic DP storage is unable to efficiently sup-
port multiple query types, DP ORAM offers strong guar-
antees with practical efficiency. Moreover, it can utilize
any ORAM algorithm as black box, allowing it to ben-
efit from future more efficient implementations.
There are many open problems from our work. First,
we have no efficient 1-round transformation from dif-
ferentially private sanitization to a differentially private
outsourced database system; our generic transformation
in this setting utilizes ORAM. Moreover, the current
set of supported queries is very limited. Ideally, we
would like to be able to support a large subset of SQL
queries while offering reasonable efficiency. Further-
more, it would be interesting to propose other privacy
notions one can aim for in this context, alternatively
to differential privacy. Additionally, we would like to
implement an actual DP ORAM system that would be
practical for real life scenarios. Toward this, we plan on
investigating how current efficient ORAM implementa-
tions (e.g., Path-ORAM [46], TaORAM [42], or oblivi-
ous computation in Intel’s SGX [33]) perform for differ-
ent query types on a DP storage system.
Finally, our work assumes that the data are accessed
only by the owner. As such, the indices, part of the
updates, look-up tables, and/or the ORAM stash are
stored locally. An interesting enhancement would be to
allow multiple users to access the outsourced database.
In this case, a first cut solution is to upload all the local
structures to the cloud after we encrypt them with a
key that is shared among the users. If we want to avoid
all users sharing a common key, we could use attribute
based encryption [41]. We plan to further investigate
this in a future work.
10. REFERENCES
[1] R. Agrawal, J. Kiernan, R. Srikant, and Y. Xu. Order
preserving encryption for numeric data. In SIGMOD,
2004.
[2] A. Arasu, S. Blanas, K. Eguro, R. Kaushik,
D. Kossmann, R. Ramamurthy, and R. Venkatesan.
Orthogonal security with cipherbase. In CIDR, 2013.
[3] A. Arasu, K. Eguro, R. Kaushik, and R. Ramamurthy.
Querying encrypted data (tutorial). In ICDE, 2013.
[4] Y. Azar, A. Z. Broder, A. R. Karlin, and E. Upfal.
Balanced allocations. Journal on Computing,
29(1):180–200, 1999.
[5] S. Bajaj and R. Sion. Trusteddb: A trusted
hardware-based database with privacy and data
confidentiality. TKDE, 26(3):752–765, 2014.
[6] A. Beimel, S. P. Kasiviswanathan, and K. Nissim.
Bounds on the sample complexity for private learning
and private data release. In TCC, 2010.
[7] A. Beimel, K. Nissim, and U. Stemmer. Private
learning and sanitization: Pure vs. approximate
differential privacy. In APPROX, pages 363–378.
Springer, 2013.
[8] A. Blum, K. Ligett, and A. Roth. A learning theory
approach to non-interactive database privacy. In
STOC, 2008.
[9] A. Boldyreva, N. Chenette, Y. Lee, and A. O’neill.
Order-preserving symmetric encryption. In
EUROCRYPT, 2009.
[10] M. Bun, K. Nissim, and U. Stemmer. Simultaneous
private learning of multiple concepts. In ITCS, 2016.
[11] M. Bun, K. Nissim, U. Stemmer, and S. Vadhan.
Differentially private release and learning of threshold
functions. In FOCS, 2015.
[12] M. Bun, J. Ullman, and S. Vadhan. Fingerprinting
codes and the price of approximate differential
privacy. In STOC, 2014.
[13] D. Cash, P. Grubbs, J. Perry, and T. Ristenpart.
Leakage-abuse attacks against searchable encryption.
In CCS, 2015.
[14] T.-H. H. Chan, E. Shi, and D. Song. Private and
continual release of statistics. TISSEC,
14(3):26:1–26:24, 2011.
[15] Z. Chang, D. Xie, and F. Li. Oblivious RAM: a
dissection and experimental evaluation. In VLDB,
2016.
[16] I. Demertzis, S. Papadopoulos, O. Papapetrou,
A. Deligiannakis, and M. Garofalakis. Practical
private range search revisited. In SIGMOD, 2016.
[17] C. Dwork. Differential privacy in new settings. In
SODA, 2010.
[18] C. Dwork, K. Kenthapadi, F. McSherry, I. Mironov,
and M. Naor. Our data, ourselves: Privacy via
distributed noise generation. In EUROCRYPT, 2006.
[19] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith.
Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data
analysis. In TCC, 2006.
[20] C. Dwork, M. Naor, T. Pitassi, and G. N. Rothblum.
Differential privacy under continual observation. In
STOC, 2010.
[21] C. Gentry. Computing arbitrary functions of
encrypted data. CACM, 53(3):97–105, 2010.
[22] O. Goldreich. Towards a theory of software protection
and simulation by oblivious rams. In STOC, 1987.
[23] O. Goldreich and R. Ostrovsky. Software protection
and simulation on oblivious rams. JACM,
43(3):431–473, 1996.
[24] H. Hacigu¨mu¨s¸, B. Iyer, C. Li, and S. Mehrotra.
Executing sql over encrypted data in the
database-service-provider model. In SIGMOD, 2002.
[25] M. Hay, V. Rastogi, G. Miklau, and D. Suciu.
Boosting the accuracy of differentially private
histograms through consistency. In PVLDB, 2010.
[26] B. Hore, S. Mehrotra, M. Canim, and
M. Kantarcioglu. Secure multidimensional range
queries over outsourced data. VLDBJ, 21(3):333–358,
2012.
[27] B. Hore, S. Mehrotra, and G. Tsudik. A
privacy-preserving index for range queries. In VLDB,
2004.
[28] M. S. Islam, M. Kuzu, and M. Kantarcioglu. Inference
attack against encrypted range queries on outsourced
databases. In CODASPY, 2014.
[29] S. Kamara. How to search on encrypted data, 2015.
https://cs.brown.edu/ seny/slides/encryptedsearch-
full.pdf.
[30] G. Kellaris, G. Kollios, K. Nissim, and A. O’Neill.
Generic attacks on secure outsourced databases. In
CCS, 2016.
[31] M. Kuzu, M. S. Islam, and M. Kantarcioglu. Efficient
privacy-aware search over encrypted databases. In
CODASPY, 2014.
[32] J. Li and E. R. Omiecinski. Efficiency and security
trade-off in supporting range queries on encrypted
databases. Data and Applications Security XIX, pages
69–83, 2005.
[33] M. Maas, E. Love, E. Stefanov, M. Tiwari, E. Shi,
K. Asanovic, J. Kubiatowicz, and D. Song. Phantom:
Practical oblivious computation in a secure processor.
In CCS, 2013.
[34] F. McSherry. Privacy integrated queries: An
extensible platform for privacy-preserving data
analysis. In SIGMOD, 2009.
[35] D. Mir, S. Muthukrishnan, A. Nikolov, and R. N.
Wright. Pan-private algorithms via statistics on
sketches. In PODS, 2011.
[36] I. Mironov, O. Pandey, O. Reingold, and S. P. Vadhan.
Computational differential privacy. In CRYPTO, 2009.
[37] M. Naveed, S. Kamara, and C. V. Wright. Inference
attacks on property-preserving encrypted databases.
In CCS, 2015.
[38] R. A. Popa, F. H. Li, and N. Zeldovich. An
ideal-security protocol for order-preserving encoding.
In SP, 2013.
[39] R. A. Popa, C. M. S. Redfield, N. Zeldovich, and
H. Balakrishnan. Cryptdb: Protecting confidentiality
with encrypted query processing. In SOSP, 2011.
[40] W. Qardaji, W. Yang, and N. Li. Understanding
hierarchical methods for differentially private
histograms. In VLDB, 2013.
[41] A. Sahai and B. Waters. Fuzzy identity-based
encryption. In EUROCRYPT, 2005.
[42] C. Sahin, V. Zakhary, A. El Abbadi, H. Lin, and
S. Tessaro. Taostore: Overcoming asynchronicity in
oblivious data storage. In SP, 2016.
[43] E. Shi, J. Bethencourt, T.-H. H. Chan, D. Song, and
A. Perrig. Multi-dimensional range query over
encrypted data. In SP, 2007.
[44] E. Shi, T.-H. H. Chan, E. Stefanov, and M. Li.
Oblivious RAM with o((logn)3) worst-case cost. In
ASIACRYPT, 2011.
[45] E. Stefanov, E. Shi, and D. X. Song. Towards
practical oblivious RAM. In NDSS, 2012.
[46] E. Stefanov, M. Van Dijk, E. Shi, C. Fletcher, L. Ren,
X. Yu, and S. Devadas. Path oram: an extremely
simple oblivious RAM protocol. In CCS, 2013.
[47] V. Vaikuntanathan. Computing blindfolded: New
developments in fully homomorphic encryption. In
FOCS, 2011.
[48] X. Xiao, G. Wang, and J. Gehrke. Differential privacy
via wavelet transforms. TKDE, 23(8):1200–1214, 2011.
[49] D. Xie, G. Li, B. Yao, X. Wei, X. Xiao, Y. Gao, and
M. Guo. Practical private shortest path computation
based on oblivious storage. In ICDE, 2016.
[50] W. Zheng, A. Dave, J. G. Beekman, R. A. Popa, J. E.
Gonzalez, and I. Stoica. Opaque: An oblivious and
encrypted distributed analytics platform. In NSDI,
2017.
